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1  Introduction
Inequality is a subject of intrinsic interest, in the sense that it is related to moral 
concepts such as justice and fairness.1 Notwithstanding, it is also important for its 
effects, for example, on the growth and educational attainments of a society. 
Ironically, it is one of the most hotly debated subjects within growth and develop-
ment economics literature and one which is far from reaching a consensus.
A first wave of development literature (as characterized by Easterly 2007, p. 756) 
presents the idea that high inequality could promote growth by concentrating income 
in the hands of high-saving capitalists (Kuznets 1955; Kaldor 1956). As presented in 
Aghion et al. (1999b), the view that wealth inequality could be growth enhancing is 
based on three arguments: (1) the marginal propensity to save of the rich is higher 
than that of the poor; (2) investment indivisibilities; and (3) the trade- off between 
productive efficiency and equality. However, later works indicate a possible negative 
effect of economic inequality on growth, both theoretically and empirically.2 Several 
mechanisms were suggested as causes of this, such as political economy mecha-
nisms (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994), imperfect capital 
markets (Banerjee and Newman 1991; Galor and Zeira 1993; Perotti 1992) and 
investment in human capital (Bourguignon and Verdier 2000; Galor et al. 2009; 
Galor and Zeira 1993; Perotti 1996), the composition of the aggregate demand 
(Murphy et al. 1989), and macroeconomic instability (Aghion et al. 1999a).3
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1 These concepts and interrelations are investigated since the birth of philosophy in Ancient Greece. 
See the works of Plato (e.g., The Republic) and his disciple Aristotle (e.g., Politics).
2 For comprehensive reviews, see Aghion (1999b) and Bénabou (1996).
3 For the effects of redistribution on growth, see Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Perotti (1996), and 
Aghion (1999b).
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Three important studies followed, casting doubt on the robustness of what were 
then considered consistent results, and finding no negative relationship between 
economic inequality and growth. Using new data and panel techniques, Forbes 
(2000) finds a positive relationship between economic inequality and growth. Barro 
(2000) and Banerjee and Duflo (2003) also present evidence against such a clear-cut 
negative relationship. However, Easterly (2007), using an insightful instrument, 
finds again a negative relationship between inequality and economic performance.
There are also important studies correlating political inequality and develop-
ment. Acemoglu (2008) shows how political inequality may retard development due 
to the unwillingness of incumbent elites to allow the entry of new agents. Elites 
might also block the introduction of new technologies (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2000). Bates (1981) shows how, in a politically concentrated environment, there 
might be little interest in the provision of public goods, including schooling. As 
noted by Acemoglu et al. (2008), political inequality will also tend to be associated 
with the absence of political competition and accountability, two factors that help to 
guarantee that political systems generate desirable outcomes.
Even more important for the present work are Engerman and Sokoloff’s compre-
hensive series of studies on development of the Americas. Engerman and Sokoloff 
(1997, 2002) argued that factor endowments had a major influence on the coloniza-
tion strategies throughout the American continent that, in turn, established different 
initial levels of inequality that account for the divergent institutional paths of 
American societies that resulted in the differential development standards of these 
regions today. Therefore, in Engerman and Sokoloff’s view, inequality had prejudi-
cial effects on development in a cross-country framework.4
It is to this context of apparently contradictory evidence that Acemoglu et al.’s 
(2008) study belongs. Their study distinguishes empirically between economic and 
political inequality in their exploration of the effects of inequality. As the authors 
correctly note, economic inequality is probably endogenous in regressions without 
a political inequality variable, since we expect them to be linked, and this might bias 
the econometric evidence on the effects of economic inequality. The authors not 
only construct different variables for economic inequality (the land Gini) and politi-
cal inequality (a political concentration index) but also deal with a constant de jure 
institutional environment, the region of Cundinamarca in Colombia, which, accord-
ing to Pande and Udry (2005), might provide deeper insights into the specific chan-
nels through which inequality affects development.
4 Two brief comments on Engerman and Sokoloff’s thesis: (i) Theories presented by North et al. 
(2000), which emphasize the importance of metropolitan objectives in contrast to local conditions, 
and Frankema (2010), which supports the role of precolonial institutions, are likely complemen-
tary to the one by Engerman and Sokoloff (for a review of these theories, see Frankema 2009, 
Chap. 3); and (ii) we believe that the validity of Engerman and Sokoloff’s theory is in a cross-
country framework, and, therefore, studies such as those by Nunn (2008), Acemoglu et al. (2008), 
and Dell (2010) do not necessarily oppose their views. Moreover, as shown by Nugent and 
Robinson (2010), there can be heterogeneities with Latin America.
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The authors present intriguing evidence. Overall, they find a negative relationship 
between economic and political inequality for nineteenth-century Colombia and a 
positive association between economic inequality in the nineteenth century and 
development outcomes in the late twentieth century. These results are unexpected, as 
it is generally expected for Latin American countries to have high inequality, both 
economic and political, and that they are positively correlated (mutually reinforc-
ing each other). The interpretation of the authors, based on Bates’ (1981) insights on 
Africa, is that in “weakly institutionalized” societies, where few constraints were 
imposed on the actions politicians could take, large landowners had the power to 
keep in check the rapacious tendencies of these politicians.5
We provide a similar investigation for the complex case of Brazil. With unique 
data from the beginning of the twentieth century—the Brazilian Economic and 
Demographic Census of 1920—we were able to construct from scratch unique indi-
cators of economic inequality (the land Gini coefficient among landowners) and of 
political inequality (the proportion of individuals that were eligible to vote) at the 
municipal level in selected Brazilian states. However, we not only analyze how 
inequality (both economic and political) is related to long-term development, but we 
also go further into analyzing how inequality is related to long-term development 
within different de facto institutional environments while controlling for a constant 
de jure context (in line with Pande and Udry’s reorientation argument).
Therefore, we are able to integrate both the inequality literature and the recent insti-
tutional literature (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Pande and Udry 2005; 
Banerjee and Iyer 2005).6 We calculate the respective inequality indicators for all the 
municipalities in four Brazilian states: Minas Gerais, São Paulo, Pernambuco, and Rio 
Grande do Sul. The states were carefully selected in order to capture how inequality is 
related to long-term development in different de facto institutional environments 
greatly influenced by the unique colonial experiences of these regions. Our analysis 
presents evidence of a heterogeneous relationship between inequality and long-term 
development indicators, broadly consistent with the colonial experiences of the states 
considered, likely a reflection of different de facto institutional environments.
Furthermore, our study intersects with an important recent literature on the 
Brazilian case. Naritomi et al. (2012) present evidence that colonial experiences 
indeed shaped different de facto institutional environments within the country. 
Summerhill (2010), exploring the state of São Paulo, does not find a negative effect 
of land inequality on long-term development.7 Moreover, and in line with our 
results, the author does not find a significant relationship between political inequality 
measured by the extent of the franchise and long-term economic growth. In a state-
level analysis, Wegenast (2010) argues that Brazil’s different agrarian structures 
determined, in the long run, the educational outputs. His analysis suggests that in 
5 The concept of “weakly institutionalized societies” is developed in Acemoglu et al. (2004).
6 For a more systematic approach and review of the institutional literature, see Acemoglu et al. (2005).
7 De Carvalho Filho and Colistete (2010), examining the same state of São Paulo at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, find a negative correlation between land concentration and supply of 
public education at that time.
Inequality, Institutions, and Long-Term Development…
116
states with higher land concentration, there were fewer incentives to invest in 
education. Moreover, for the Latin American context, Dell (2010), investigating the 
negative effects of the mita, suggests that land concentration would have been a 
beneficial factor, for it is hypothesized that the long-term presence of large-scale 
landowners in non-mita districts provided a stable land tenure system that encour-
aged public goods provision.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we explore the Brazilian 
development process from a historical perspective. We then proceed to the data 
analysis. Next, we present the econometric results. The last section concludes.
2  The Brazilian Context
2.1  Some History
Brazil was first claimed by modern Europeans in 1500. The interest of Crown and 
settlers would soon turn to the production of sugar, which became the colony’s first 
major export. International prices were high and the supply, especially from Sicily, 
Atlantic islands such as Cape Verde and Madeira, and the East, was low and restricted. 
At the time, the main production centers were in Pernambuco and in Bahia. Brazil 
was the biggest sugar producer in the world until mid-seventeenth century—the 
heyday of the sugar enterprise in Brazil—when competition from Central American 
colonies and the Antilles became stronger (Prado Jr. 1956 [1945]).8
As expected, geographical characteristics were determinant for the success of 
this enterprise. Moreover, although there was no general overall plan for the sugar 
enterprise, potential problems were largely avoided thanks to favorable circum-
stances. Production techniques, the creation and expansion of a consumer market, 
and financing were largely dealt with by the Dutch, who practically controlled the 
so-called Portuguese enterprise. Due to economies of scale, production was based 
on large land properties with a single owner, called latifúndios, characterized mainly 
by monoculture and slave labor. Prado Jr. (1956 [1945]) notes the absence of 
complex methods of production in colonial Brazil, both in terms of space and time, 
or even significant improvement in methods. Production expansion was based on 
the extension of land under cultivation and on slave population growth rather than 
on changes in the production process and increased productivity.9
8 The competition from the Antilles was a direct consequence of the Dutch experience with the 
sugar industry in Brazilian lands before their expulsion in 1654. After learning the technical and 
organizational aspects, they were able to implement a similar structure in the Caribbean territories 
and generate higher profits (Furtado 2006 [1959]).
9 According to Prado Jr., Brazil’s development problems are a direct consequence of the dependence 
of the colony on exports of primary products produced in large properties with slave labor. 
However, Villela (2013) argues that none of these elements can explain for themselves Brazil’s 
lack of growth at the time, the lack of efficiency gains being the fundamental problem.
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Furtado (2006 [1959]) argues that the high profitability of an economy with a 
high import coefficient tends to hinder investments in secondary activities, such as 
food production. The intense specialization of the sugar economy would be then 
associated with its high profitability (Furtado 2006 [1959], p. 93). As a result, cattle 
raising shifted to the countryside of the Northeastern region. This activity was 
radically different from the sugar industry, occupying extensive areas of land, and 
the impact of the dry seasons was reflected in the absence of permanent occupation. 
Not only was there no need for large initial capital investments, but also the large 
amount of land available hindered productivity increases.
In the early seventeenth century, sugar exports began to decline, mainly due to 
increasing competition from British, Dutch, and French colonies. Prices continued 
to fall throughout the eighteenth century. With the decline of the sugar industry, 
income fell also in the cattle farming sector, which then became mostly a subsis-
tence activity, allowing a continued growth of the population since the activity could 
be easily expanded due to the availability of land. The growth of the share of the 
cattle farming sector in relation to the sugar industry brought with it a decline in the 
region’s average per capita productivity and income.
The problem was that the accelerated growth of the sugar enterprise had no struc-
tural counterpart. The economic system, under which almost all the net income gen-
erated stayed with the large landowners, often resorted to importing luxury goods, 
slaves, or machines for that same sugar industry, and underwent no significant 
change during this period. Therefore, the whole enterprise depended heavily on the 
external market. With the continued fall in prices and the increased opportunity costs 
due to the emergence of the mining regions, the sugar economy entered a “secular 
lethargy” (Furtado 2006 [1959], p. 91) that endured until the nineteenth century.
At the same time, economic enterprises in the Northeast did not completely stagnate 
with the decline of sugar production. The second half of the eighteenth century saw 
a rise in international demand for other agricultural products, particularly cotton, 
due mainly to the Industrial Revolution. The rural parts of the state of Pernambuco, 
being drier and, therefore, more suitable for the production of cotton rather than 
cattle raising, would also benefit.
During most of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the southern part of the 
colony was relatively free of direct intervention from the Crown. With the main 
economic interest focused on sugar production, settlers in those other regions lived 
at the margin of the colonial enterprise. Soon after the fall of sugar prices after 1650, 
this geopolitical structure changed. In the last years of the seventeenth century, gold 
and other precious metals were discovered in the countryside of the Portuguese 
territory, especially in Minas Gerais. By the mid-eighteenth century, gold mining had 
reached its greatest land extent and highest levels of production. For almost a century 
(1675–1765) gold mining would be the focus of the attentions of the Crown (Prado 
Jr. 1956 [1945]). Migrants arrived from different parts of the country and new towns 
sprang up in the mining districts. Along with the shift of the colony’s economic 
center from the Northeast to the Southeast, there was also shift in the political center. 
As a consequence, Rio de Janeiro replaced Salvador (Bahia) as the capital of the 
colony in 1763.
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Although mining also made use of slave labor, the social structure was less rigid 
than in the sugar-producing areas. Slaves were never the majority among the popu-
lation. Gold mining led to greater social inclusion, for it was not necessary to have 
important amounts of initial capital. Possibilities were greater even for slaves, who 
could often work for themselves and buy their freedom. Therefore, although the 
average income in the gold economy was inferior to the average income at the 
 apogee of the sugar economy (Furtado 2006 [1959]), income was more broadly 
distributed and the percentage of free people was higher. This influx of wealth led 
the Portuguese Crown to rapidly establish a bureaucratic apparatus to avoid tax eva-
sion.10 The heyday of the Brazilian gold rush was in the 1750s, when exports reached 
2.5 million British pounds (Furtado 2006 [1959]).11
However, the decline of the Brazilian gold rush came soon, due to its geographi-
cal characteristics (alluvial), inferior extraction techniques, and a bureaucracy inca-
pable of providing sustainable incentives to the enterprise. Denis (1911, p. 61) 
notes: “As the surface of the alluvial workings became exhausted by wasteful meth-
ods, a great part of the population was gradually absorbed by agriculture and stock- 
raising. (…) During the nineteenth century the mining activities of Minas were not 
very notable: although it was discovered that the alluvial deposits had been merely 
scratched on the surface.” With the decline of the gold cycle and the persistent low 
international prices for sugar, the last years of the eighteenth century were charac-
terized by economic difficulties in the colony. All in all, “the latifundium, slavery, 
and the export trade remained, as the historian Caio Prado Jr. has said, for more than 
300 years the principal institutions of Brazilian society” (Dean 1971, p. 607).
Early in the nineteenth century, a major political event changed the development 
path followed by the colony. In 1808, by order of Prince Regent Dom João, fleeing 
from Napoleon’s troops, the Portuguese royal family is transferred to Brazilian 
lands.12 In 1822, in a country with approximately 3.9 million inhabitants (of which 
1.2 million approximately were slaves), Dom Pedro—son of Dom João (who was 
then in Portugal), the colony’s regent at the time—declared independence and was 
proclaimed Constitutional Emperor, remaining in power until 1831. After a regency 
period (1831–1840) characterized by great social instability, his son, Dom Pedro II, 
10 Examples of important administrative controls by the Portuguese Crown are the payment of one-
fifth of the production (and their careful supervision through all stages of the mining activity), 
prohibition on individual negotiations, establishment of special trading monopolies, and tight 
control on local manufacturing.
11 In 1780 the value of gold exports was less than one million British pounds (Furtado 2006 [1959]).
12 According to Prado Jr. (1956 [1945]) this was effectively the end of the colonial period for Brazil. 
New economic measures were soon adopted. The first and probably the most important measure 
was a manifesto declaring that all Brazilian ports should be considered open to trade with the entire 
world, and that goods might be exported under any flag. At the same time, royal monopolies were 
abolished and import duties reduced, laws prohibiting the establishment of industries were 
repealed, a national press was established (Denis 1911), and new educational and financial institu-
tions (such as the first Banco do Brasil, in 1808) were established as well.
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became the new emperor in 1840. Finally, in 1889 the Republic was proclaimed and 
1891 saw the implementation of a new constitution.
Notwithstanding the government’s intention of dealing with land concentration 
under the Empire, efforts would eventually fail, largely because the political system 
was dominated by a landed elite (Dean 1971). Furthermore, the positive effects on 
prices of the events at the end of the eighteen century and beginning of the nineteenth 
century were due to a confluence of particular circumstances.13 Once international 
markets returned to normal conditions, a new phase of difficulties began for the 
colony: conflicts with England, on which newly independent Brazil had become 
dependent, mainly due to the unilateral application of the liberal economy by the 
former (Furtado 2006 [1959]) and worries with the end of the slave trade, the scarcity 
of the government’s financial resources, and the increasing dissatisfaction in practi-
cally every region led to a series of social rebellions. In the midst of these difficul-
ties, a new source of wealth would emerge: coffee, which led to a new period of 
economic affluence in the country.14
Like Minas Gerais, the region that corresponds to what is today the state of São 
Paulo was only of marginal economic importance during the first centuries of 
 colonization. Although São Paulo was not completely outside the great sugar enter-
prise, it was coffee that made the region especially important. Coffee was introduced 
into the country in 1727 and large-scale production started at the end of the 
eighteenth century.15 However, it was at the beginning of the nineteenth century that 
Brazilian production became significant in international terms.16
It is around this time that the labor question became delicate. With the abolition 
of slavery it became clear that the country’s best option was to import foreign work-
ers. After initial problematic experiences and with government’s generous interven-
tion, it was possible, for the first time in the country’s history, to attract a massive 
influx of European migrants.17 The average numbers of non-slave immigration grew 
steadily from the 1860s to the end of the century.18
13 Important international events were beneficial for a colony whose main activity was the export of 
primary products: the Industrial Revolution, the American War (1775–1783), the French Revolution 
(1789–1799), the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), and the upheaval in many of the Spanish colo-
nies had a significant impact on the supply and, therefore, prices of primary goods in which Brazil 
had an idle production capacity, such as sugar, cotton, and leather.
14 According to Goldsmith (1986), we have the following figures for the average growth in GDP per 
capita: 1850–1860: 1.4 %; 1860–1870: 1.0 %; 1870–1880:−0.2 %; 1880–1890: 0.4 %; 1890–1900: 
−1.7 %. For a different view, see Leff (1997).
15 The USA was the main market for the Brazilian product (Prado Jr. 1956 [1945]).
16 Figures provided by Furtado (2006 [1959]) show that the production was of 3.7 and 5.5 million 
sacks in the periods 1880–1881 and 1890–1891, respectively, rising to 16.3 million between 1901 
and 1902 (one sack was equivalent to 60 kg).
17 For example, after several charges of abuse, Germany prohibited emigration to Brazil in 1859.
18 The figures for the annual average numbers of immigrants, by decade, are 1860–1869: 9850; 
1870–1879: 20,780; 1880–1889: 47,890; 1890–1899:118,170; and 1900–1909: 66,651 (Leff 1972).
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As we have seen, the last years of the nineteenth century were extremely favorable 
for the production of coffee in the Brazilian lands, especially in Rio de Janeiro, São 
Paulo, and Minas Gerais regions. Not only were internal conditions conducive 
towards increasing production, but there was also the auspicious external circumstances 
of supply shortages.19 However, considering the inelasticity of international demand 
and the large availability of lands and relative production advantages, it was inevi-
table that the coffee supply would continue to increase, with a consequent decline 
in prices. The response of the coffee planters and the government (tightly con-
nected) to these adverse prospects was to implement valorization programs that 
consisted in buying and storing the excess coffee so as to control international 
prices.20 However, this mechanism for protecting the coffee economy was only 
“a process that transferred, to the future, the solution of a problem that would only 
become more and more serious” (Furtado 2006 [1959], p. 256). The policy was 
relatively successful until the 1920s, when the Great Depression brought Brazil into 
a new era of difficulties and political disruption.
Rio Grande do Sul would only become economically relevant in the second half 
of the eighteenth century. The region’s economy would be based on cattle farming. 
According to Prado Jr. (1956 [1945]), the cattle would reproduce rapidly due to the 
favorable natural environment, providing the region with the greatest concentration 
of cattle in the colony. Production of derivatives such as dairy products and leather 
was also of considerable importance. Agriculture would be developed only in a 
small sector near the coast (Prado Jr. 1956 [1945]). Initially, similar to the country 
side of the Northeast region, cattle farming developed as an extensive activity. 
Leather exports helped to maintain what was then a low-profitability activity afloat. 
It was only with the already mentioned discovery of gold that the activity faced a 
“true revolution,” being finally integrated with the rest of the colony (Furtado 2006 
[1959], p. 121).
Following Prado Jr. (1956 [1945]) and Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002), we 
can say that a different colonization method was structured. Variations in geographic 
characteristics such as climate and soil meant that the lands that today form the state 
of Rio Grande do Sul were not suited for the production of tropical products such as 
sugar. In order to protect the region from possible competitors such as Spain, the 
solution was to establish a settlement strategy similar to the one in the USA and 
Canada. Recruitment was made among poor and middle-class Portuguese families 
and peasants and considerable advantages were offered to those willing to emigrate 
(Prado Jr. 1956 [1945]).
Thus, the settlement of the South region of the country, especially Rio Grande do 
Sul, was unlike any others in Brazilian colonization. Land was more equally divided, 
slave labor was used in much smaller scale, and the population was rather homoge-
neous (Prado Jr. 1956 [1945]).
19 Supply constraints in the main production centers, such as the Portuguese Ceylon—present-day 
Sri Lanka—encouraged the Brazilian production.
20 Brazil had practically a monopoly on coffee production, being responsible, at its height, for 
producing more than three-quarters of the international supply (Furtado 2006 [1959]).
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2.2  Political Aspects
In terms of political participation, Love (1970) states that the end of the Empire and 
the establishment of the Republic (1889) saw a democratization of the formal politi-
cal process at three levels. The first is that the number of elective positions at all 
levels of government was increased (governors and the president and vice president 
of the Republic were now to be elected). Second, suffrage was expanded compared 
to the Empire. Under the first republican Constitution on 1891, all literate males 21 
and older could vote. Finally, authority was decentralized.
There is some divergence between Love’s (1970) and Leal’s (2012 [1948]) views. 
Probably the reality was closer to Leal’s explicit exposition, which notes the great 
fragility and dependence of the municipal administration, despite some increase in 
revenues noted by Love (1970). As we will see in greater detail later, the introduc-
tion of these liberal constitutional mechanisms of government, broader suffrage, and 
decentralization did not result in the type of de facto political structure that the 
members of the 1890–1891 constituent assembly had envisaged (Love 1970).
A central aspect of the Brazilian history for our study is the coronelismo, one of 
the most important characteristics of the First Republic (1889–1930). Leal (2012 
[1948]) defines it as the result of a combination of the representative system of the 
time and an inadequate social and economic structure. In other words, coronelismo 
is a peculiar manifestation of the private sector, an adaptation through which resid-
ual elements of old and excessive private power have managed to coexist in a politi-
cal regime of (theoretically) broad representation. It is a commitment between the 
public sector, progressively strengthened, and the decadent influence of the local 
chiefs, mainly the landowners (Leal 2012 [1948]). “Without the requisite social and 
economic structures, universal suffrage could either produce long-term political sta-
bility or strengthen traditional conservative elements against liberal reforms” (Love 
1970, p. 4), and in the Brazilian case during the First Republic, “the official liberal 
ideology, on which the Constitution of 1891 was based, had outpaced the social and 
economic evolution of the country” (Love 1970, p. 10).
According to Leal (2012 [1948]), these manifestations of private sector power, 
especially in rural areas, are due to the agrarian structure of the country, characterized 
mainly by strongly concentrated land ownership.21 The vast distances and empty 
areas within the territory, as well as the scarcity of people, greatly influenced the 
situation (Carvalho 1946). Therefore, the public sector commitment is explained by 
the sufficiently broad franchise that makes the government dependent on the rural 
electorate. The essence of this commitment is that local chiefs provide  unconditional 
21 According to Love (1970), the nation remained 90 % rural in the early years of the Republic. 
Furthermore, Love (1970) argues that the critical role played by urbanization is based on three 
main points: (i) Brazilian rural society, owing to its historical roots, has a much stronger patriarchal 
tradition than its urban counterpart, and for this reason the rural vote was easier to control; (ii) the 
rural sector offered more opportunity for manipulation of the vote through fraud and violence, 
because the state and its mechanisms for guaranteeing free suffrage were less effective in the coun-
tryside; and (iii) the access of the urban population to greater opportunities for education meant 
that a large percentage of urban dwellers would vote than their rural counterpart.
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support to the “official” candidates in state and federal elections, and in return, the 
states give the local chiefs a free hand in almost all issues that concern the municipality, 
including the appointment of state positions at local level (Leal 2012 [1948]).
In an agrarian society with high land concentration, where the public sphere was 
largely absent in rural areas, the coronel was often responsible for improving local 
conditions, especially in terms of the provision of public goods and services: schools, 
roads, railroads, churches, and hospitals among others. It was, therefore, mostly with 
such improvements (some of which depend only on his political prestige while others 
might demand personal contributions or contributions from friends) that the munici-
pal chief built and maintained his leadership position (Leal 2012 [1948]).
Leal’s (2012 [1948]) analysis stressed the importance of the reciprocity in the sys-
tem. On the one side, the municipal chiefs and the coronéis who decided the choices of 
many voters and, on the other, the politically dominant situation in the state controlled 
the budget, the jobs, the favors, and the police force. The weakness of the municipali-
ties was therefore a deciding factor in maintaining the coronelismo.
Just as coronelismo ruled relations between municipalities and states, the política 
dos governadores (“governors’ policy”) ruled relations between the states and the 
federal government.22 Leal (2012 [1948]) shows clearly the contradiction in the sys-
tem: by arguing that there should be constraints placed on the powers of the munici-
palities to avoid rule by local oligarchies, legislation gave the governors of the states 
every means for encouraging the very same local oligarchies, albeit to their benefit, 
creating state oligarchies and the consequent política dos governadores.23 Both the 
commitment between the governors and the coronéis and the one between the presi-
dent and the governors were based on the inconsistency of the rural electorate, a direct 
consequence of the type of agrarian structure dominant in the country.
3  The Data24
3.1  The Census of 1920
The Census of 1920 is the fourth population census and the first agricultural and 
industrial census to have been conducted in Brazil. In accordance with the 
International Statistical Congress, which took place in Belgium in 1853, the purpose 
22 It was a “system in which the president assured the governors of the states that their parties would 
always win elections in their respective jurisdictions in exchange for support of presidential 
policies in congress (which favored export agriculture) and electoral support of the president’s 
successor” (Love 1970, p. 9).
23 The politics of the coronéis led to the strengthening of the state power in a much more effective 
way than the política dos governadores guaranteed the reinforcement of the federal power, 
especially in terms of the different possibilities of the use of violence (Leal 2012 [1948]).
24 As we can see from Table 2, the number of municipalities has increased considerably between 1920 
and 2000. In order to assess the effects of inequality on development in the long term, we had to match 
the municipalities in 2000 (2150 municipalities) to their counterpart in 1920 (512 municipalities). 
The construction of the comparable territorial units (CTU) was done manually using the reports 
of IBGE of each municipality’s origin. Table 2 presents the number of CTU for each state.
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of an agricultural census is to “indicate the facts in which the complete knowledge 
of the conditions, process, and results of the agrarian statistics of each country at a 
specific time, depends” (IBGE 1923, p. v). Therefore, it is the first reliable survey 
of the agrarian conditions throughout the nation.
The Census contains detailed information on the quantity and average size of 
rural properties at the municipal level, which enables us to construct our measures of 
land inequality, which we use as proxy for economic inequality, for each of the four 
states of interest: Minas Gerais, São Paulo, Pernambuco, and Rio Grande do Sul.25
The number of rural properties surveyed throughout the country is 648,153, with a 
total area of 175,104,675 ha (Table 1), which corresponds to 20.6 % of the country’s 
entire area. We have data on 115,655 rural properties in the 178 municipalities of 
Minas Gerais, 80,921 rural properties in the 204 municipalities of São Paulo, 23,336 
rural properties in the 59 municipalities of Pernambuco, and 124,990 rural properties 
in the 71 municipalities of Rio Grande do Sul. Specifically, surveyed rural properties 
corresponded to 46.1 % of the area of Minas Gerais (27,393,210 ha of a total of 
59,381,000), 56.2 % of the area of São Paulo (13,904,631 ha of a total of 24,723,900), 
52.0 % of the area of Pernambuco (5,157,198 ha of a total of 9,925,400), and 65.1 % 
of the area of Rio Grande do Sul (18,589,996 ha of a total of 28,528,900).
Table 1 gives us an indication of the concentration of land distribution in Brazil. 
Nearly half (49.0 %) of the properties are smaller than 41 ha. However, these rural 
properties constitute only 3.5 % of the surveyed area. The largest share of the surveyed 
area consists of properties between 2001 and 5000 ha (16.4 %). Impressively, proper-
ties larger than 25,000 ha correspond to 15.6 % of the surveyed area (more than the 
area occupied by properties smaller than 200 ha, which is 14.9 %).
25 The average territorial extension of the rural properties is divided into the following measurements: 
(i) less than 41 ha; (ii) 41–100 ha; (iii) 101–200 ha; (iv) 201–400 ha; (v) 401–1000; (vi) 
1001–2000 ha; (vii) 2001–5000 ha; (viii) 5001–10,000 ha; (ix) 10,001–25,000 ha; and (x) 
25,001 ha or more.
Table 1 Brazilian agricultural statistics, 1920
Extension of the rural 
properties (ha)
Number of rural 
properties
Percentage to 
total (%) Area (ha)
Percentage 
to total (%)
Smaller than 41 317,785 49.0 6,115,158 3.5
41–100 146,094 22.5 9,593,156 5.5
101–200 71,377 11.0 10,454,242 6.0
201–400 48,877 7.6 14,079,761 8.0
401–1000 37,705 5.8 23,881,734 13.6
1001–2000 13,186 2.0 18,891,552 10.8
2001–5000 8963 1.4 28,667,844 16.4
5001–10,000 2498 0.4 17,928,532 10.2
10,001–25,000 1207 0.2 18,256,042 10.4
Bigger than 25,000 461 0.1 27,236,654 15.6
Total 648,153 100.0 175,104,675 100.0
Source: IBGE (1923). Census of 1920. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, Vol. 3
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As expected due to its large area and economic importance, Minas Gerais is the 
most populous state, with a population of 5,888,174 inhabitants. The second most 
populous state is São Paulo (population: 4,592,188), followed by Rio Grande do Sul 
(population: 2,182,713), and finally Pernambuco (population: 2,154,835). However, 
Pernambuco has the highest population density: 0.22 persons per hectare. Figures 
for São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul are 0.19, 0.10, and 0.08, 
respectively (Table 2).
Table 2 also presents figures on the number of foreigners and occupational 
shares. Consistent with the recent inflow of migrants, foreigners represent 18.1 % of 
the population of São Paulo. Figures for Minas Gerais and Pernambuco are much 
lower: 1.5 % and 0.5 %, respectively. Rio Grande do Sul, in between São Paulo and 
Minas Gerais and Pernambuco, has 6.9 % of its population composed by foreigners. 
Agricultural activities are the main occupation for the four considered states. The 
percentage of individuals working on these activities ranges from 16.9 % in Rio 
Grande do Sul to 21.4 % in Pernambuco. Figures for Minas Gerais and São Paulo 
are 21.0 % and 18.3 %, respectively. Industrial activities include a much lower share 
of the population. Minas Gerais has the lowest share of population working in such 
activities: 2.5 %. As expected, São Paulo has the highest share of population work-
ing in industrial activities: 5.0 %. Figures for Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Sul 
are 3.3 and 3.9 %. Less than 1.0 % of the respective populations work in “liberal 
professions.”
Considering the large and detailed data set provided by the census, we note with 
curiosity the lack of studies using the data to determine the levels of inequality. One 
possible reason is that the information has not yet been digitalized, which makes 
data collection very onerous. For this study, both data compilation and elaboration 
of the indexes have been done from scratch and have resulted in what are, to our 
knowledge, unique for the municipal level in Brazil for 1920.
3.2  Land Distribution and Political Concentration
Land has been very unequally distributed in Brazil since colonial times. Brazil’s 
agrarian structure has been largely characterized by large landholding. Figures from 
the Census of 1920 show that 71.5 % of the rural properties surveyed were smaller 
than 101 ha, while only 4.1 % were bigger than 1000 ha. However, the same 71.5 % 
of rural properties corresponded to only 9.0 % of the total area surveyed, while the 
4.1 % corresponded to 63.4 % of the total area. Of the 648,153 rural properties sur-
veyed, only 461 (0.1 %) were larger than 25,000 ha, which nevertheless corre-
sponded to 15.6 % of the total area surveyed (a higher proportion than the 535,256 
properties smaller than 201 ha, 14.9 %). However, the larger the landholdings, the 
lower the unit value of land (IBGE 1923, p. xii).
Table 3 presents the figures broken down by state, revealing several important 
features. First, Rio Grande do Sul, with 124,990 rural properties, is the state with the 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































properties while São Paulo and Pernambuco had 80,921 and 23,336 rural proper-
ties, respectively. However, the total area of the properties surveyed is larger in 
Minas Gerais (27,393,210 ha) than in Rio Grande do Sul (18,589,996 ha). This is 
consistent with our second feature: while all states present a similar pattern to the 
country as a whole by presenting a higher concentration of rural properties smaller 
than 101 ha, there are important variations within this pattern. Whereas only 26.5 % 
of the rural properties in Pernambuco are smaller than 41 ha (with 48.1 % smaller 
than 101 ha), a total of 61.7 % of the rural properties in Rio Grande do Sul are 
smaller than 41 ha (with 83.6 % smaller than 101 ha). The figures for São Paulo and 
Minas Gerais are 48.4 % (with 73.7 % smaller than 101 ha) and 32.3 % (with 60.5 % 
smaller than 101 ha), respectively. Third, of the total area surveyed, rural properties 
smaller than 101 ha represent only 9.2 % for Pernambuco (with 2.8 % of properties 
smaller than 41 ha) and 11.1 % for Minas Gerais (with 2.9 % of properties smaller 
than 41 ha). However, properties smaller than 101 ha make up 17.9 % of the sur-
veyed area for Rio Grande do Sul and 15.2 % for São Paulo.
Another important aspect of the agrarian structure of the country is that the larg-
est share of the surveyed area is usually composed of properties between 401 and 
1000 ha: 20.1 % of the area of Minas Gerais, 30.1 % of the area of Pernambuco, and 
18.2 % of the area of São Paulo. However, for Rio Grande do Sul properties between 
2001 and 5000 ha occupy the largest relative area: 19.8 %. Finally, we highlight the 
impressive share of properties bigger than 25,000 ha in São Paulo and Minas Gerais: 
7.4 % and 6.7 %, respectively.
With the available information, we were able to construct two types of measures 
of economic inequality. The first one is the standard land Gini coefficient, which 
measures land inequality among landowners.26 The average land Gini considering 
all the comparable territorial units (CTU) from the four states was 0.61. The average 
coefficient was 0.60 for Minas Gerais, 0.44 for Pernambuco, 0.65 for São Paulo, 
and 0.63 for Rio Grande do Sul (Table 4).
Although widely used, the standard land Gini does not capture one important 
aspect of economic inequality: it does not take into account individuals who do not 
own land. If, for example, land is divided equally among 10 % of the individuals in 
a given society, while the other 90 % remain without land, the standard land Gini 
coefficient will indicate that this society is perfectly egalitarian. Therefore, if we 
want a proxy for economic inequality for the population as a whole, we need an 




















, where n is the number of rural properties, ai is the farm size, 
and i denotes the rank, where rural properties are ranked in ascending order of ai. The calculation is 
made using the Stata programs ineqdec and ineqdec0.
Inequality, Institutions, and Long-Term Development…
128
Table 4 Descriptive statistics (CTU)
All CTU
Minas 
Gerais Pernambuco São Paulo
Rio Grande 
do Sul
Land Gini (1920) 0.61 0.60 0.44 0.65 0.63
(0.13) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.18)
Overall land Gini 
(1920)
0.85 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.71
(0.14) (0.06) (0.12) (0.13) (0.21)
Voters (%, 1920) 7.56 8.14 5.52 6.71 10.71
(2.61) (2.41) (199) (1.85) (2.47)
GDP per capita (log, 
2000)
8.50 (0.62) 8.35 (0.51) 7.65 (0.52) 8.77 (0.51) 8.71 (0.53)
Average years of 
schooling (2000)
5.18 4.93 3.67 5.63 5.68
(111) (0.91) (1.12) (0.87) (0.86)
Infant mortality (2000) 23.50 25.42 54.75 15.53 17.15
(14.03) (6.55) (14.47) (4.90) (3.79)
HDI (2000) 0.76 0.76 0.64 0.79 0.79
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Poverty (%, 2000) 28.76 31.04 62.16 19.17 24.84
(17.60) (14.30) (11.15) (10.26) (9.54)
Income Gini (2000) 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.54 0.55
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Source: (1) IBGE. Censuses; (2) IPEA; (3) Own calculations
Notes: (1) Standard deviations in parenthesis; (2) these are descriptive statistics constructed for 
the CTU
overall land Gini. We constructed our overall land Gini for the municipalities in 
1920 using the same formula as Acemoglu et al. (2008) and Summerhill (2010), by 
computing the same equation assigning zero landholdings to the estimated number 
of families that do not have landholdings.27 The average overall land Gini for the 
CTU considered in this study is 0.85. The average overall land Gini coefficients are 
0.87 for Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, and São Paulo (with the standard deviation for 
Minas Gerais, 0.06, being half of those for Pernambuco and São Paulo, 0.12 and 
0.13, respectively), and 0.71 for Rio Grande do Sul (Table 4).
The Census of 1920 also allows the construction of our proxy for political 
inequality in the early twentieth century: the percentage of individuals eligible to 
vote.
According to the Constitution of 1891, only literate Brazilian men 21 and older 
were eligible to vote.28 Therefore, using the data on population and literacy for 
27 Acemoglu et al. (2008) use an estimate of ten members per family, while Summerhill (2010) 
constructs his coefficients by assigning five members per family. We constructed the overall land 
Gini with the assumption of 7, 10, and 15 members per family. Our main variable is the one using 
an estimate of 15 individuals per family because it supposedly includes relatives and other aggre-
gates living in the same property, an important element in early twentieth-century Brazil.
28 The Constitution of 1891 was in force from 1891 to 1934.
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municipalities, we can easily calculate the percentage of the population of each 
municipality which was eligible to vote in 1920. The average percentage of indi-
viduals eligible to vote considering all the CTU of our study is 7.6. In 1920, the 
average percentage of individuals eligible to vote was 8.1 for Minas Gerais, 5.5 for 
Pernambuco, 6.7 for São Paulo, and 10.7 for Rio Grande do Sul (Table 4). We see 
that Rio Grande do Sul appears to be more equal not only in an economic sense 
(overall land Gini coefficient), but in a political sense as well. Moreover, we see a 
higher level of political inequality in Pernambuco, where a high percentage of the 
population was illiterate at the beginning of the twentieth century.
4  Quantitative Analysis
4.1  Inequality and Long-Term Development
In order to explore the long-term consequences of land (economic) inequality and 
political inequality for development in Brazil, we exploit the cross-sectional vari-
ation in the CTU for our four states of interest: Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, São 
Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul.
We first estimate cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of 
the form
 y g p xi i i i i
2000 1920 1920= + + +a b d e¢. . .  
where yi2000 is a measure of development for the CTU i for the year 2000, xi is a vec-
tor of control covariates, and εi is an error term. The key variables in this equation 
are gi1920 and pi1920, the (standard) land Gini coefficient for the CTU i in 1920 and the 
constructed variable for political inequality (percentage of eligible voters) for the 
same CTU i in 1920, respectively.29 Therefore, our main interest is the consistent 
estimation of α and β.
The regressions will be estimated with all the observations and dummy interac-
tions, allowing for differential statistical relationships for each state. We will there-
fore be able to capture possible different de facto institutional environments, with 
such differences rooted in specific colonial experiences of each state. As dependent 
variables, we will first use what we call “main outcome variables,” which are GDP 
per capita, average years of schooling, and infant mortality.
As previously discussed, the inclusion of these specific states has a clear purpose. 
Each of these regions is representative of a particular colonial experience within a 
constant de jure environment. This likely led to different de facto institutional envi-
ronments that might cause inequality to relate in heterogeneous ways with each 
29 We note that there is no uniform framework in the literature for the econometric analysis of the 
effects of historical inequality. In this study, we follow mainly Acemoglu et al. (2008).
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development indicator. Pernambuco is representative of the old agrarian structure, 
of great importance during the colonial era due to the sugar production that had 
far-reaching implications for the political, economic, and social structure of the 
region. Minas Gerais was the center of the gold cycle and later became an important 
producer of coffee and a center for the supply of goods for the domestic market. São 
Paulo was the main coffee producer, and in the late nineteenth century became 
Brazil’s most important economic center, a position that it still occupies today. Rio 
Grande do Sul had a later occupation with characteristics associated to those of 
North America (see, e.g., Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, 2002), and vast numbers of 
European immigrants (as in São Paulo) shaping its development path.
The main econometric concern with this specification is the possible endogeneity 
bias generated by omitted variables.30 In other words, if omitted factors in εi are cor-
related with the explanatory variables, the estimation by OLS will generate inconsis-
tent estimators. Easterly (2007), based on the extensive economic history developed by 
Engerman and Sokoloff, has argued that growing conditions  (topography, climate, and 
soil) favorable to the production of cash crops contribute to higher inequality. Therefore, 
we will control for a rich set of covariates (included in the vector xi).
4.2  Contemporary Outcomes
We start by providing results of simple regressions (weighted correlations), using as 
independent variables the land Gini (as discussed, among landowners) and the per-
centage of eligible voters (our franchise—political inequality—indicator) and one 
30 The key condition for OLS consistency is the absence of correlation between the independent 
variables and the error term. A sufficient condition is the zero conditional mean assumption: 
E xe /( ) = 0 , which means that the error term is not correlated with any function of the indepen-
dent variables. In applied econometrics, endogeneity arises in one of the three ways: (1)  omitted 
variable bias; (2) measurement error; and (3) simultaneity (Wooldridge 2010). Our main concern 
is the omitted variable bias due to the inability to control directly for variables such as land quality. 





















(Wooldridge 2010, p. 67). Our strategy in this study is to use a proxy variable solution. There are 
two formal requirements for a proxy variable for the omitted variable q: (1) the proxy variable 
should be redundant in the structural equation, E y x q z E x q| , , ,( ) = ( ) , where z is the proxy vari-
able; and (2) the correlation between the omitted variable q and each xj be zero once we partial out 
z: L q x x z L q zk| 1, , , , | 1,1 ¼( ) = ( ) , where L(.) represents a linear projection (Wooldridge 2010).
31 Technically, we have a simple regression when there is only one independent variable. In our 
case, we have at least four dummy interactions for each variable. Aiming to keep language as 
simple as possible, I will use the term “simple regressions” when there is only one independent 
variable of interest (irrespective of the number of interactions).
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multiple regression, including both inequality variables.31 As dependent variables 
we will use our “main outcome variables,” namely (natural logarithm of) GDP per 
capita, (natural logarithm of) average years of schooling, and infant mortality.32
Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients. As we can see from Column 1, the 
bivariate relationship between the land Gini and GDP per capita is heterogeneous. 
The estimated coefficients for Minas Gerais and São Paulo are positive and highly 
significant (2.43 and 1.25, respectively). While the coefficient for Pernambuco is 
not significant, the estimated coefficient for Rio Grande do Sul is not only signifi-
cant, but also negative (−1.09). The simple regression of GDP per capita on the 
percentage of eligible voters is presented on Column 2. Only for Minas Gerais and 
Rio Grande do Sul the estimated coefficients are significant. Nevertheless, they have 
the expected positive sign. When we regress GDP per capita on both inequality 
variables, the picture remains broadly the same, a reflection of the surprising low 
correlation between the land Gini and the percentage of eligible voters (0.09, 
considering all CTU).
Columns 6 and 11 suggest similar relationships between economic inequality 
in the early twentieth century and average years of schooling and infant mortal-
ity. In other words, we estimated, for both dependent variables, positive and 
highly significant coefficients for Minas Gerais and São Paulo, a negative and 
significant coefficient for Rio Grande do Sul, and a nonsignificant coefficient for 
Pernambuco. Concerning the bivariate relationship between the percentage of 
eligible voters and average years of schooling, the coefficients are positive and 
highly significant (Column 7). There is, however, a surprise when we estimate 
the regressions with infant mortality as the dependent variable: the significant 
coefficient for São Paulo suggests a positive relationship between political equal-
ity and infant mortality (Column 12). We discuss these results in greater detail 
below. Regressions including both inequality variables present similar results 
(Columns 8 and 13).
Although important in their own right, the results discussed above are only 
historical correlations. The natural concern with those correlations is the possible 
bias generated by the inconsistency of OLS estimation in the presence of omitted 
variables. We attempt to correct the estimation for this bias by controlling for a rich 
set of control variables. Another concern is that the positive correlation between the 
political inequality variable is being driven by the association of this variable with 
an educational indicator. In order to construct the franchise indicator, we took the 
number of literate males, which is likely to reflect the educational environment of 
that particular CTU. In order to control for this specific source of bias, we control 
for the educational variables in 1920.
We now discuss the extended results from regressions with GDP per capita as 
the dependent variable. The inclusion of educational controls reduces marginally, for 
Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul, the significance of the estimated coefficients 
32 For now on, when I mention “GDP per capita” or “average years of schooling” I will be referring 
to their natural logarithms.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































for the percentage of eligible voters (Column 4). We note that, while this is not the 
case for average years of schooling (Column 9), the picture is similar when infant 
mortality is the dependent variable (Column 14). When geographic and educa-
tional controls are included, we have a clearer picture. Column 5 shows that the 
results for Minas Gerais and São Paulo, of economic inequality in 1920 being posi-
tively and significantly correlated to GDP per capita in 2000, are robust. For 
Pernambuco, economic inequality appears to be non-correlated with income in the 
long run. For Rio Grande do Sul, economic inequality in 1920 remains negatively 
(and highly significant) correlated to GDP per capita in 2000. Moreover, all esti-
mated coefficients for our political inequality variable become insignificant with the 
inclusion of geographic variables.
However, the results for average years of schooling and infant mortality are dif-
ferent. First, economic inequality in 1920 is only significantly related to average 
years of schooling in 2000 for Minas Gerais and São Paulo, the states in which the 
coefficients are positive (Column 10). In other words, only positive relationships 
between economic inequality and educational attainments in the long run are sig-
nificant. Considering infant mortality, we have the opposite picture: only negative 
relationships, as the case of Rio Grande do Sul, between economic inequality and 
development in the long run are significant (reflected in a positive estimated coef-
ficient, Column 15). The percentage of eligible voters does not appear to have had 
important effects on development in the long run. Either the coefficients lose their 
significance or they present small magnitudes (Columns 10 and 15).
We now expand our analysis by introducing the overall land Gini calculated 
index. This variable, as already mentioned, shows the inequality of land distribution 
across the whole population. Extending the analysis in this direction provides fur-
ther insights into the relationship between inequality and long-term development.
Table 6 presents the regression results. Several noteworthy aspects emerge. First, 
when including both Gini variables and the percentage of eligible voters in regres-
sions with no controls and GDP per capita as the dependent variable, the land Gini 
among landowners remains significant for Minas Gerais and São Paulo, while the 
overall land Gini is significant for Pernambuco (Column 1). The inclusion of con-
trols makes all overall land Gini coefficients become insignificant (Column 2). 
Moreover, regressions with the overall land Gini as the only economic inequality 
variable (and with control variables) show no significant relationship (Column 3). 
Regressions with average years of schooling as the dependent variable present simi-
lar results (Columns 4–6), somewhat more favorable to the standard land Gini (the 
coefficient for Rio Grande do Sul is significant, Columns 4 and 5). Coefficients for 
the overall land Gini remain broadly insignificant as well in regressions with infant 
mortality as the dependent variable the inclusion of the control variables (Columns 
8 and 9). Notwithstanding, the comparison of regressions with the standard land 
Gini (Table 5, Columns 5, 10, and 15) with regressions with the overall land Gini 
(Table 6, Columns 3, 6, and 9) indicates a stronger effect of the standard land Gini.
Therefore, our empirical results suggest that the effects of land inequality among 
landowners would possibly dominate over the effects of the inequality of land 
distribution across the population as a whole.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3  De Facto Institutional Environments and Structural 
Change
This section presents the estimated inequality coefficients when controlling for dif-
ferent occupations and for immigration. The reason behind these exercises is 
straightforward: our hypothesis—that the heterogeneous relationships between 
inequality and development indicators within Brazil in the long run reflect the dif-
ferent de facto institutional environments rooted in differing colonial experiences—
is only implicit. However, other elements could plausibly account for our statistical 
results. Our main concern is with possible structural changes that might have taken 
place during our time span. In particular, we control for industrialization, urbaniza-
tion, and immigration in the various considered municipalities.
Fortunately, the Census of 1920 provides detailed data on the number of foreigners 
and of individuals working in particular occupations. We sorted the data for each munic-
ipality and constructed the share of the population dedicated to each particular category. 
Our main control variables are (1) the share of immigrants; (2) the share of individuals 
working in agricultural activities (as a proxy for urbanization); and (3) the share of indi-
viduals working in industry (such as textiles, metallurgy, and construction).
The econometric approach is the same as in previous exercises. Table 7 presents 
the estimated coefficients using the GDP per capita as the dependent variable.
Table 7 OLS regressions with structural controls: GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log GDP per capita
Immigration Agriculture Industrialization
MG*Gini 2.38*** 1.41*** 2.48*** 1.26** 2.28*** 1.22**
PE*Gini −0.19 −0.31 −0.29 −0.34 −0.15 −0.21
SP*Gini 0.46 0.37 1.15*** 0.60* 0.94*** 0.54
RS*Gini −0.99* * * −0.82*** −1.27*** −0.88*** −1.25*** −0.95***
MG*Voters 0.05*** 0.02 0.04** 0.01 0.03 0.01
PE*Voters 0.06 0.00 0.04 −0.01 0.00 −0.02
SP*Voters 0.04* 0.01 −0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01










Geographic controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Educational controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440
R2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: Own calculations
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
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An interesting picture emerges. When controlling for the share of individuals 
working in agricultural activities, we still have a positive and significant relation-
ship between economic inequality and GDP per capita in the long run for Minas 
Gerais and São Paulo, even when geographic and educational controls are included; 
for Pernambuco, coefficients remain largely insignificant; as for Rio Grande do Sul 
coefficients remain negative and highly significant (Columns 3 and 4).
However, controlling for immigration the economic inequality coefficient for 
São Paulo is no longer significant even in regressions without further controls 
(Column 1). Although the remaining coefficients maintain similar properties as the 
above-made discussion, this analysis suggests that the effects of land inequality in 
São Paulo might be reflecting the positive effects of immigration. Moreover, when 
controlling for the percentage of individuals in industrial activities São Paulo’s land 
Gini coefficient remains significant only in regressions without geographic and edu-
cational controls (Columns 5 and 6). Finally, we note that, with the exception of 
agriculture in regressions with the usual controls (Column 4), all coefficients of 
structural controls are highly significant and have the expected sign.
Thus, we have presented a robustness check for our hypothesis that the heteroge-
neous relationships between economic inequality and development within Brazil 
are due to the different de facto institutional environments. Several regression spec-
ifications show that controlling for variables proxying structural changes nonethe-
less maintains the heterogeneous results within the country. This evidence is in 
accordance with the hypothesis.
4.4  Inequality Yesterday and Inequality Today
Finally, we present a natural extension of our investigation: the relationship inequal-
ity in the past and inequality today. This is an especially interesting question in the 
Brazilian context, for Brazil is one of the most unequal countries in the world, often 
portrayed as an example of high structural and persistent inequality.
Using a framework similar to previous investigations, we econometrically exam-
ine the relationship between the (standard) land Gini in 1920 and inequality today, 
measured by the income Gini in 2000. Again, our units of analysis are the CTU. 
Results are in Table 8.
Results are broadly the same across specifications. For Minas Gerais the esti-
mated coefficient for economic inequality in 1920 is not significant in regressions 
with no controls (Column 1) and with the full set of controls (Column 3). Moreover, 
we find no significant relationship between political inequality in 1920 and eco-
nomic inequality today. For São Paulo, although the estimated coefficient changes 
its sign (it is negative in regressions with no controls, Column 1), the land Gini 
estimated coefficient is never significant. The estimated coefficient for the percent-
age of eligible voters is only significant without the inclusion of the controls and is 
very small across specifications. Therefore, we find no statistical significance for 
the relationship between economic or political inequality in the early twentieth 
century and economic inequality in 2000 in Minas Gerais and in São Paulo.
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Results for Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Sul are different. For Pernambuco, the 
state for which no statistical significance was found for the relationship between the 
land Gini in 1920 and several development outcomes (see Table 5), we now find a posi-
tive and significant relationship between economic inequality in 1920 and economic 
inequality in 2000 (Column 1), a result which remains robust when controls are 
included (Columns 2 and 3). For Rio Grande do Sul, we find even stronger relation-
ships. The estimated coefficient for the land Gini is positive and highly significant in all 
specifications (Columns 1–3). The estimated coefficient for political inequality, 
although sometimes significant, is again of very small magnitude for both states.
Therefore, there is a positive relationship between economic inequality at the 
beginning of the twentieth century and economic inequality in 2000 precisely in 
those states where we do not find a statistically significant positive relationship 
between economic inequality in 1920 and development in the long run. In other 
words, where economic inequality is not “structural,” there is a positive relationship 
between inequality in land distribution and long-term development.
5  Conclusion
This study aimed to investigate the historical consequences of inequality and the 
role of institutions. By focusing on the Brazilian case, we provide evidence of the 
relative and potentially distinct roles of economic inequality and political inequality 
on long-run development. We believe this to be a necessary step to improve our 
understanding of the causes of underdevelopment in Latin America.
We constructed from scratch both economic inequality variables (the standard 




MG*Gini 0.01 0.06* 0.06
PE*Gini 0.06* 0.06* 0.06*
SP*Gini −0.02 0.02 0.01
RS*Gini 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.14***
MG*Voters −0.00 0.00 −0.00
PE*Voters 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01**
SP*Voters 0.01*** 0.00** 0.00
RS*Voters 0.00 0.00** 0.00*
Geographic controls No Yes Yes
Educational controls No No Yes
Observations 440 440 440
R2 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: Own calculations
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
Table 8 OLS regressions for 
the income Gini (2000)
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(the percentage of eligible voters) at the municipal level for the states of Minas 
Gerais, Pernambuco, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul. The states were specifi-
cally chosen for their different colonial experiences, which probably shaped their 
de facto institutional environment. Our selection was made on the basis of the 
abundant data provided by the 1920 Census, a source which, surprisingly, had not 
yet been exploited for this purpose.
The results are surprising. First, we find almost no correlation between the land 
Gini and the percentage of eligible voters in Brazilian municipalities in 1920. 
Second, and somewhat unexpectedly, we find a positive relationship between eco-
nomic inequality in early twentieth century and development outcomes in 2000 for 
the states of Minas Gerais and São Paulo, both from the Southeast region. 
Pernambuco, a Northeastern state, presents no evidence of a significant relation-
ship between economic inequality and long-term development outcomes, while the 
evidence for the South, the state of Rio Grande do Sul, is that the relationship is 
negative. Third, we find no robust significant relationship between political 
inequality, measured by the percentage of eligible voters, and long-term develop-
ment outcomes. Fourth, the effects of economic inequality are largely due to the 
concentration of land among landowners, as shown by the insignificance of the 
overall land Gini.
These are interesting results, for they appear to contradict the general view that 
economic inequality would always be costly for a society and that greater political 
participation would foster development. The answer to part of this riddle might lie 
in the fact that political participation was very low in early twentieth-century Brazil, 
and a marginal increase (the econometrically captured effect) might have given 
more irrelevant votes to a captured political system, leaving the economic outcomes 
unchanged. In other words, greater franchise might not have given the population 
more political participation. With regard to the effects of economic inequality, when 
considering the land Gini in an agrarian structure, these are likely to be strongly 
linked to collective action problems. In a captured political system such as Brazil in 
the Old Republic, land concentration might have differing effects, especially when 
taking into account that, in some regions, landowners were largely responsible for 
the provision of public goods.
Further important analyses were conducted. First, we find evidence that there 
is almost no correlation between economic (land) inequality in the early twenti-
eth century and recent income inequality in states where there is a positive rela-
tionship between economic inequality and long-term development (Minas Gerais 
and São Paulo). In other words, the positive effects of inequality are associated 
with a particular structural organization at a specific time, in contrast to a more 
structural inequality, which, as exemplified by the cases of Pernambuco and Rio 
Grande do Sul, would have either negative or no significant effects on long-term 
development.
Finally, our hypothesis that different de facto institutional environments are 
associated with different relationships between inequality and long-term devel-
opment was, initially, only implicit in our analysis. Important structural changes 
that occurred during this time span might be responsible for the heterogeneous 
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relationships found previously between inequality and long-term development. 
Three elements were our main concern: (1) immigration; (2) industrialization; and 
(3) urbanization. After controlling for these variables, our main results were main-
tained, strengthening our hypothesis.
It is important to note that we do not argue that inequality is conducive to devel-
opment in general. We present evidence that inequality might be associated with 
better development outcomes in the long run in a particular political context in a 
within-country framework. It is possible that the theoretically harmful effects of 
inequality are better reflected in a cross-country framework, in which the mecha-
nisms are related to the different de jure institutional environment. In other words, 
relative equality would be better for a particular country, but within an unequal 
country (with certain sociopolitical and economic characteristics) more inequality 
would be associated with better outcomes.
Much work remains to be done. We mention some possible extensions. First, 
there are few works that attempt to control for different de facto institutional envi-
ronments. Further employment of this strategy likely will provide beneficial 
insights in order to better understand the development paths of societies. Second, 
empirical and theoretical studies that offer a differentiation between within-coun-
try and cross- country effects of variables are largely welcome.33 Third, models 
attempting to capture the within-country effects of variables such as inequality in 
politically captured environments are lacking. Finally, the external validity of our 
results remains questionable. Comparative studies within Latin America are a 
logical next step.
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